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The database directive, initiated by the European Commission in 1992 and due to
be  finalised  in  the  near  future,  establishes  a  two-tiered  system  of  protection,
amending copyright with a sui generis rule that grants protection against  unfair
extraction. The terms of protection are extended if the producter makes „substantial
changes“  to  update  the  database.  This  paper  analyses  the  incentive  to  update
created by the database directive. In contrast to the usual findings of the literature
on the incentive effects of intellectual property rights, we find that, although in
most cases the incentives to update a database are insufficient from society’s point
of view, the possibility of extending the term of protection by making ‘substantial
changes’ in the database may create an incentive for excessive updating. This leads to
conclusions about what should be considered a substantial change
Zusammenfassung
Die in Datenbank-Direktive, deren endgültige Fassung in Kürze vorliegen wird,
garantiert  Datanbankproduzenten  einen  zweistufigen  Schutz:  Neben  dem
Urheberrecht existier ein sui generis Recht das vor unlauteren Auszügen schützt
und dessen Schutzdauer sich verlängert, wenn der Produzent die Datenbank durch
substantielle Änderungen aktualisiert. Dieses Papier befaßt sich mit den Anreizen
zur Aktualisierung. Im Gegensatz zu den üblichen Anreizwirkungen von Rechten
zum  Schutz  geistigen  Eigentums  ergibt  sich  hier  ein  Anreiz  zu  exzessiven
Investitionen  in  die  Aktualisierung  von  Datenbanken.  Produzenten  nehmen
Aktualisierungen  auch  dann  vor,  wenn  dies  gesamtgesellschaftlich  nicht
wünschenswert  ist.  Aus  dieser  Erkenntnis  ergeben  sich  Folgerungen  für  die
Festlegung dessen, was als substantielle Änderung gelten sollte.
JEL-Klassifikation: K11, K19
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: 1600, 1610, 1640
Keywords: Copyright, Databases, Updating
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1.  Databases and Copyright
In 1992 the European Commission issued a directive on the legal protection
of databases (OJ No. C 156, 1992), which was amended by the Commission
in  1993  (OJ  No.  C  308,  1993).  The  database  directive  was,  in  principle,
adopted by the Council in July 1995 (Common position no 20/95, OJ No. C
288, 1995) and is still subject to final approval by the European Parliament
which is expected to propose only minor changes and amendments.
The  database  directive  establishes  a  two-tiered  system  of  protection:
databases shall be protected under copyright or, if the collection of data does
not  constitute  an intellectual creation, under a sui  generis  rule  that  grants
protection against unfair extraction.
This proposal for a directive can be seen as a further development in the
European policy to extend and harmonise copyright protection throughout
the  community.1  Databases  are  regarded  as  a  „...  vital  tool  in  the
development of an information market within the Community; whereas this
tool will also be of use in many other fields“ (Recital 9).2
Since the „... database manufacture requires the investment of considerable
human, technical and financial resources while such databases can be copied
or accessed at a fraction of the cost needed to develop them independently“
(Recital 7), the rights of authors of databases have to be explicitly protected
by the law to provide incentives to create databases.
Databases,  however,  are  different  from  most  other  forms  of  intellectual
property insofar as a collection of information intended to be used to ease
the retrieval of information gathering will possibly lose its value if it is not
updated.3 Consider, for example, a database containing legal provisions and
court  decisions  that  is  used  by  lawyers  for  retrieving  all  available
information  concerning  one  specific  legal  case.  Unless  new  pieces  of
legislation and new court rulings are added continuously, this database loses
its value as a source of reference and is eventually of interest only to scholars
of legal history. To prevent the valuation for his product from decreasing,
the supplier of database services, therefore, not only has to incur the costs of
creating the database in the first place, but also the costs necessary to update
the database continuously.
                                               
1  Another  example  for  the  extension  of  copyright  protection  to  include  new  information
goods  can  be  seen  in  the  adoption  of  a  directive  on  the  legal  protection  of  computer
programs (OJ No. L 122, 1991).
2  All quotations from the database directive are taken from the Common position (OJ No. C
288, 1995).
3  Note that this feature is typical for almost all collections of data, and as such even for e.g.
road maps, railway time-tables or the Guide Michelin. Thus, the use of the term „database“
should not lead to the misperception that the problems addressed in this paper are specific
to electronically stored data.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 2
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This paper will analyse to what extent the legal protection of databases can
create an incentive to update the database. The proposed directive explicitly
aims  at  an  incentive  for  the  creation  of  databases  and  the  provision  of
database services, because „... an investment in modern information storage
and retrieval systems will not take place ... unless a stable and uniform legal
protection regime is introduced for the protection of the rights of database
manufacturers“  (Recital  12).  We  will  ask  how  the  decision  to  update  a
database depends on the extent to which the producer can claim property
rights to the database.
Furthermore,  we  address  the  question  of  whether  the  incentive  of  legal
protection  given  to  the  producers  of  databases  actually  guarantees  that
databases are updated whenever it is socially optimal to do so. In contrast to
the usual findings  of  the  literature  on  the  incentive  effects  of  intellectual
property rights, we find that, although in most cases the incentives to update
a database are insufficient from society’s point of view, the possibility of
extending  the  term  of  protection  by  making  ‘substantial  changes’  in  the
database may create an incentive for excessive updating. Since the supplier of
database services can induce a rent-shift from consumer surplus to producer
profits if the term of protection  is renewed, he may have an incentive to
update even if it is not socially optimal to do so.
Section 2 summarises the proposal concerning the scope of protection and
relates these provisions to the updating decision. In section 3 we will analyse
how  the  decision  to  update  a  database  depends  on  the  legal  provisions
governing the protection of the database. Section 4 recapitulates the results
with  respect  to  the  proposed  directive.  Section  5  concludes  with  some
remarks on a potential extension of the analysis.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 3
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2.  The  Proposed  Directive  on  the  Legal  Protection  of
Databases and Updating
The  proposed  directive  applies  to  databases  which  are  defined  as  “...
collection  of  works,  data  or  other  independent  materials  arranged  in  a
systematic or methodical way and capable of being accessed by electronic or
other means.” (Art. 1, 2) and excludes “... computer programs used in the
manufacture or operation of databases which can be accessed by electronic
means.” (Art. 1, 3).4 Member states are required to grant copyright protection
to  databases  which  “by  reason  of  the  selection  or  arrangement  of  their
contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual creation...” (Art. 3, 1).5
If  a  database  is  not  eligible  for  protection  under  copyright,  i.e.  if  the
collection does not constitute an intellectual creation, the directive obliges
Member States to „... provide for a right for the maker of a database which
shows that there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial
investment  in  either  the  obtaining,  verification  or  presentation  of  the
contents, to prevent acts of extraction and/or or re-utilization of the whole or
of  substantial  parts,  evaluated  qualitatively  and/or  quantitatively,  of  the
contents of that database.” (Art. 7, 1)
Thereby,  the  Directive  requires  the  creation  of  a  sui  generis  right  against
unauthorised  extraction  and/or  re-utilisation  which  is  intended  to
“safeguard the position of makers of databases against misappropriation of
the results of the financial and professional investment incurred in obtaining
and collecting the contents by providing that certain acts done by the user or
a competitor in relation to ... a database are subject to restriction” (Recital
39).  This sui generis  right „is not to be considered in any way as an extension
of copyright protection to mere facts of data“ (Recital 45). Unlike copyright,
it is not  granted to  the author  of a database but rather its maker who is
defined as “the person who takes the initiative and the risk of investing”
which “excludes subcontractors in particular from the definition of maker”
(Recital 41).6
The creation of a right to prevent unauthorised extraction follows from the
recognition  that  even  the  mere  collection  of  data,  facts,  or  statistical
                                               
4  Somewhat inconsistently, however, “protection under this Directive may also apply to the
materials  necessary  for  the  operation  or  consultation  of  certain  databases  such  as  the
thesaurus and indexation systems” (Recital 20).
5  One  problem  with  the  legal  protection  of  databases  is  the  possible  conflict  between  the
copyright in the database and copyrights in the works or materials that are incorporated into
the database. This possible conflict of legal claims from copyright protection, however, shall
be neglected for the purposes of this paper. The reader is referred to legal analyses of the
proposed directive (see, among others, Röttinger, 1992, Hoebbel, 1993 or Heker, 1993).
6  Thus, copyright in a database and the sui generis right can be vested in different persons,
which may create legal problems. For an extensive evaluation of the database directive from
a legal perspective see Downing (1996`).The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 4
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information that  will be  of  value  to  potential  users  will  require  both  the
investment  of  a  considerable  effort,  and  human,  technical  and  financial
resources (cf. Röttinger, 1992, p. 598). Unless it constitutes an author’s own
intellectual creation, however, such  a collection would not  be  eligible  for
copyright protection.
Consider, for example, a telephone directory. The creative effort to compile
the necessary information is close to zero. The directory should be complete,
such that the selection of telephone customers to be included cannot be seen
as a form of creative expression, and the way the data are ordered should be
clear  from  alphabetical  convention.  Nonetheless,  compiling  all  the  data
necessary  to  create  a  complete  and  ordered  directory  of  customers  of  a
telephone network from scratch may require a considerable investment.7
The reason for creating a new right besides copyright can be found in the
fact that „... in the absence of a harmonized system of unfair competition
legislation or of case-law in the Member States, other measures are required
to prevent unfair extraction and re-utilization of the contents of a database“
(Recital 6)8.
While  the  original  and  amended  drafts  had  addressed  the  question  of
compulsory licensing of the sui generis right (which may be one reason why
the  sui  generis  right  does  not  apply  to  databases  for  which  copyright
protection  has  been  obtained),  the  Common  position  does  not  deal  with
compulsory licenses.  Rather, “protection by the sui generis right must not be
afforded in such  a way as to  facilitate  abuses  of  a  dominant  position,  in
particular as regards the creation and distribution of new products...” and
“therefore,  the  provisions  of  this  Directive  are  without  prejudice  to  the
application of Community or national rules of competition” (Recital 47).9
                                               
7  This is true even for the compilation of already existing data and their transfer to another
medium. For example, Pro CD, a Massachusetts based company, sells data-storing compact
discs „which carry the names, addresses and numbers of all 83 m telephone subscribers in
America. ProCD’s digital directory costs $299; the firm has 250,000 customers. ... Pro CD
spends over $100,000 to acquire some 5,000 telephone directories, both yellow and white
pages, from all 1,250 American telephone companies. ... Pro CD ships them to Beijing, ... The
books are torn up and individual pages are passed to workers trained to regognise Roman
characters (and paid $2,000 a year - twice the salary of a university professor in China). ... In
America, Pro CD’s legal position is clear. The federal courts have ruled  that  bare  list  of
names,  numbers  or  business  categories  lack  the  creative  content  necessary  for  copyright
protection.  ...  In  Britain,  for  which  Pro  CD  is  developing  a  compact  disc  ...  the  law  is
different. The ‘skill and labour’ that BT, which sells its own annual CD directory at £299
($465),  puts  into  compiling  its  lists  is  enough  to  ensure  that  it  retains  copyright."  (The
Economist, January 14th - 20th 1995, p. 83)
8  For a general analysis of the legal protection of databases by means of copyright or laws
against  unfair  competition  see    Hackemmann  (1987),    Scheller  (1988),    Mehrings  (1989),
Hillig (1992) or  Katzenberger (1992).
9  The explicit reference to competition law, in particular Art. 86 of the EU Treaty, may reflect
the impact of the ECJ’s ruling in Magill, where the refusal to licence information was found
to constitute an abuse of a dominant position.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 5
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The terms of protection for databases protected by copyright are implicitly
defined  by  the  Protection  Directive  (Council  Directive  93/98,  OJ  No.  L
290/9, 1993 - 70 years after the death of the author). The sui generis right
„shall run from the date of completion of the making of the database. It shall
expire fifteen years from the first of January of the year following the date of
completion” (Art. 10,1) or “fifteen years from the first of January of the year
following the date when the database was first made available to the public”
(Art. 10, 2) in cases where a database has been made available to the public
before the expiry of the period for which it is protected according to Art. 10,
1.10
While  the  limitation  of  copyright  protection  may  not  be  considered  an
effective limitation because the lifetime of a database (i.e. the time for which
the database services are in demand) will most likely be less than the term of
protection, the limitation of the right to prevent unfair extraction to 15 years
may be relevant for the producer if the lifetime of his database exceeds the
term of protection.
This limit in the term of protection may have an influence on the decision to
update the database, for example if the updating costs are not covered by the
revenues from the sale of database services that the producer could obtain
without being able to prevent unauthorised extraction. If ‘copiers’ can extract
data  from  the  original  database  for  the  purpose  of  building  their  own
database to compete with the producer of the original database, then they
can offer their database services at a lower price which puts the producer of
the original database under competitive pressure.
The producer of the database, however, can extend the term of protection by
making  ‘substantial  changes’:  “Any  substantial  change,  evaluated
qualitatively or quantitatively, to the contents of a database, including any
substantial change resulting from the accumulation of successive additions,
deletions or alterations, which would result in the database being considered
to be a substantial new investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively,
shall qualify the database resulting from that investment for its own term of
protection.”  (Art.  10,  3)  In  other  words,  by  continuing  to  invest  in  the
database,  the  maker  of  this  database  can  extend  the  protection  if  his
investment is found to constitute a substantial change.
In  the  following  section  we  analyse  the  impact  of  the  proposed  form  of
protection  on  the  producer’s  decision  to  update  the  database,  where  this
updating
•  requires effort and the use of resources by the producer;
                                               
10  This  term  has  been  extended  by  the  amended  proposal  (OJ  No.  C  308,  1993)  and  the
extension has been upheld in the Common position. The original proposal limited the right
to prevent unauthorised extraction to 10 years (cf. Art. 9, 3 of the original proposal, OJ No. C
156).The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 6
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•  preserves  the  value  users  place  on  the  database,  thus  protecting  the
database from ‘depreciation’; and
•  gives  rise  to  a  fresh  term  of  protection  if  it  qualifies  as  a  ‘substantial
change’.
3.  An analysis of the incentives for updating databases
Having  identified  the  updating  issue  as  the  main  difference  between
databases  and  other  forms  of  intellectual  property,  we  now  look  at  the
incentives for updating a database under different assumptions  about the
extent to which the producer of the database can claim property rights.
The producer sets a price that maximises his profit from the sale of database
services,  given  the  variable  cost  of  distributing  database  services,  the
(potential) competition by copiers of his database11, and the (total) demand
of users for database services. If copiers compete with the original producer,
they offer database services at a price that equals their long run marginal
cost.
With free entry of copiers into the market, this price can be assumed to equal
the minimum average cost of copiers, denoted as k. If copying itself is costly,
this  minimum  average  cost  is  above  the  marginal  cost  of  serving  an
additional user with database services12. We can assume this marginal cost of
providing users with database services to be equal for the original producer
and the copiers.  Therefore,  with  the  marginal  cost  of  providing  database
services equal to c, the price charged for database services under competition
from copiers is equal to k > c. For the sake of simplicity, we normalise c to
zero in our subsequent analysis.
For the analysis of legal protection of databases we have to consider different
scenarios. Limited protection, comparable to the usual copyright framework,
can be modelled as a situation where the producer is free from the threat of
copiers only in the period in which the database has been produced, but not
in  any  subsequent  period.  The  possibility  for  extending  protection  by
                                               
11  We will assume that database services are heterogenous. Thus, specific database services can
be  obtained  only  from  either  the  producer  of  this  database  or  copiers  of  exactly  this
database. Of course, different databases may be close substitutes, such that producers of
different databases face a situation of monopolistic competition. Even in this case, however,
every producer of databases faces a downward sloping demand curve for database services.
This is a necessary assumption for the subsequent analysis (although the price elasticity may
be very high if close substitutes for a specific database are offered by other suppliers).
12  The costs of copying may entail the cost of building one’s own system for retrieving the
information.  Consider  the  case  of  copiers  who  extract  data  from  a  database.  To  supply
database services on their own to potential users, they have to incorporate this data in their
own  information  retrieval  system,  because  the  basic  data  obtained  by  extraction  from  a
database are not the same as a database. For further discussion see  Röttinger (1992, p. 598),
who compares data with raw materials that have to be transformed into a database to yield
marketable services.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 7
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updating the database will be captured by modelling an additional period of
protection conditional on the decision to update the database.
Let x(p) denote the per-period demand for database services depending on
the price charged per unit13 for an up-to-date database. The corresponding
inverse demand function is denoted by p(x). A database is defined to be up-
to-date in the period in which it is produced (from scratch).
We will assume that the value of databases for their users declines without
updating, and that by updating the producer can prevent this decrease.14 Let
γ denote the fraction of the valuation of an out-of-date database such that the
inverse  demand  functions  for  an  out-of-date  database,  depending  on  the
amount spent on updating, can be written as po(x) = γp(x).
We  will  assume  that  the  valuation  of  an  updated  database  can  never  be
higher than the valuation of a database that has been produced from scratch,
such that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
The cost of updating the database is denoted by U ≥ 0. Updating should
never  be  more  expensive  than  producing  the  database  from  scratch
(compiling the information, developing an appropriate information retrieval
system, etc.) which will be denoted by F (with U ≤ F).15
If the producer is the only supplier of database services and is not threatened
by (potential) competition from copiers16, he will serve users up to the point
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
With c normalised to zero, the producer sells the monopoly output xm = xmo
for both an up-to-date and an out-of-date database.17 Accordingly, prices are
                                               
13  The notion of a ‘unit’ may be ambiguous, depending on whether the user is charged a fixed
amount regardless of the intensity of his use (as in the case of databases sold on CD-ROM or
on-line databases with a fix access charge) or whether the charge depends on the amount of
data retrieved or the time spent using the database (as in the case of some on-line services).
Of course, also a combination of a fixed access charge and a varriable charge depending on
the intensity of use is possible. While for our purpose these different ways of charging for
database services can be neglected, it is important to note that  they can be used to price
discriminate between different types of users.
14  Of course, „updating“ a database is hardly ever a discrete choice, but should be measured as
a continuous process of replacing parts of and amending the database. In this respect, the
question of the optimum time path of updating arises in addition to the question of how
much  the  producer  should  and  will  spend  on  updating.  For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we
assume that the decision of whether to update can be modelled as a discrete choice. This
restrictive assumption will not be crucial as long as the optimum “size” of the individual
updating activities can be determined independently of the timing of updates. An interesting
extension of the model presented in this paper, however, could allow for partial as well as
delayed  update,  and,  thus,  treat  the  decision  on  the  timing  of updating  and  the  size  of
individual updates interdependently.
15 The  difference  between  F  and  U  expresses  the  cost  advantage  of  the  original  producer
relative to another producer who would have to produce the database from scratch.
16  This is to say that if copying the database is prohibited by the law and the law is perfectly
enforced, or if copying the database is too  expensive  for  copiers  to  be  able  to  serve  the
market at a price below the monopoly price set by the original produer.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 8
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equal to pm for an up-to-date database and equal to pmo = γpm for a database
that  has  not  been  updated.  Revenue  (or  gross  profit)  from  the  sale  of
database services will be denoted by πm and πmo = γπm, respectively.
In the case where the producer is effectively threatened by competition from
copiers (in the case where copying is not effectively ruled out by law and k <
pm or k < γpm, he will set a price equal to k (Bertrand-price)18
The number of users buying database services is xk or xko, both of which are
larger  than  xm,  and  revenues  from  the  sale  of  database  services  will  be
denoted by πk and πko, respectively.
We now turn to the consumer surplus in each case. If the producer sets the
monopoly price, consumer surplus S is Sm and Smo = γSm respectively. In the
case  of  Bertrand-pricing,  consumer  surplus  is  denoted  by  Sk  and  Sko,
respectively.
Aggregate welfare is defined as the sum of profits and consumer surplus.
Although we are primarily interested in the incentives for updating, some
general results with regard to the decision to produce the database in the
first place should briefly be recalled:19
•  The socially optimal use of a database would require the marginal user to
pay a price of zero (or, more generally, a price equal to c) for database
services. Since the information contained in the database is characterized
by  nonrivalry  in  use,  all  users  with  a  positive  valuation  should  be
admitted. The sum of consumer surplus and producer profits is maximal
at the maximum possible x. Any positive price above zero (or c) generates
a so-called ‘welfare loss due to underutilization’ (cf. Novos and Waldman
(1984)).
                                                                                                                                    
17  This can be seen from setting marginal revenue equal to zero for both cases. In the case of an
up-to-date database, this means that p(x) + x(dp/dx) must equal zero. In the case of an out-
of-date database, γ(p(x) + x(dp/dx)) must equal zero. Solving both both first order conditions
must result in an identical x.
18  If copiers enter the market, competition will lead to a price equal to the long run minimum
average cost of copiers, k. The profit to the original producer will depend on the amount of
database services he supplies under competition. Thus, the producer gets maximum profit if
his market share is one hundred percent.The maximum possible profit in the case where
copiers enter the market is equal to the profit the producer can get for sure if he sets his price
at a level that prevents copiers from entry. If potential copiers are expected to  enter  the
market as long as they can at least cover their long run minimum average cost, then the
original producer will be able and will have an incentive to prevent copiers from entering
the market by setting his price at k - ε (with  ε > 0). As ε can come arbitrarily close to zero,
the price set by the producer can be said to equal k. Note that under this assumption copiers
will never supply database services. The threat of competition, however, forces producers to
set Betrand-prices. Note also that the producer, being the sole supplier of database services,
is efficient as long as k > c. If the producer can serve an additional user more cheaply than a
copier, copying databases involves a waste of resources.
19  These results draw on the more general welfare analysis of copyright protection (see e.g.
Koboldt, 1995).The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 9
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•  A database should be produced if the costs of creation F are less or equal
to  the  sum  of  individual  valuations.  This  resembles  the  well-known
optimality condition for the provision of public goods. Unless producers
can engage in perfect price discrimination, the profits from the sale  of
database services they can earn to cover the costs of creating the database
are  less  than  the  sum  of  individual  valuations.  Therefore,  profit
maximising producers will not necessarily produce a database if it were
socially optimal to do so.20
•  Whenever producers are restricted in their price setting by the threat of
competition by potential copiers, profits from the sale of database services
are less than monopoly  profits. Therefore, a database  that  would  have
been  produced  by  a  profit-maximising  monopolist  in  the  absence  of
potential  competition  will  not  necessarily  be  produced  if  the  original
producer can expect copiers to compete with him. A legal provision that
effectively prohibits copying serves as an incentive for the production of a
database. The legal protection of databases, therefore, diminishes the so-
called ‘social welfare loss due to underproduction’ (see also Novos and
Waldman(1984)).21
•  Legal protection of databases changes the incentives to the producers of
databases  only  if  k  is  lower  than  the  respective  monopoly  prices.  The
threat of copying may be an impediment to the production of databases
only if the costs associated with copying itself are sufficiently low. The
costs of copying a database may show extreme variations. While it may be
very costly to copy a database22 that is accessible only for on-line research,
copying a database that  is distributed on CD-ROM  could  be  relatively
cheap.23  Thus,  legal  protection  of  databases  may  be  an  issue  only  if
distribution on CD-ROM is relatively important as compared to on-line
access.
                                               
20  We will abstract from the possibility of side-payments between users and producers. This
issue is captured in perfect price discrimination since, to ensure production whenever it is
socially optimal, each user would have to pay his individual net benefit from the use of
database services at a given price p which should be set to zero (or c). Therefore, a scheme of
side-payments that guarantees production whenever it is socially optimal is equivalent to
perfect price discrimination.
21  It  should  be  obvious  that  even  in  the  case  of  monopolistic  producers,  the  number  of
databases produced may be below the socially optimal level. Thus, the possibility of a social
welfare loss due to underproduction exists, unless the producer of at least the ‘marginal’
database can engage in perfect price discrimination. Since a reduction of the welfare loss due
to underproduction which raises profits from the sale of database services (without price
discrimination) necessarily leads to higher prices and lower quantities, this will increase the
social welfare loss due to underutilization.
22  ... or to extract its content in a form that can be used by the extractor to supply database
services himself...
23  A database on CD-ROM contains not only the data, but also the retrieval system necessary to
access  the  information.Furthermore,  with  access  to  the  complete  database  on  CD-ROM,
information about how the data are organized can be obtained from a detailed analysis of
the database.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 10
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In  the  following  analysis,  we  will  focus  on  the  problem  of  updating,
assuming that the database has been produced. A producer will decide to
invest in updating as long as the cost of updating is less than the fall in
profits he would otherwise incur as a result of the database becoming out of
date. The decline in profits that can be prevented by updating depends on
whether the producer will be subject to (potential) competition from copiers
after updating and, thus, on the legal regime and on the value of k. Table 1
summarises the respective conditions for individually and socially optimal
updates in different cases. 24





























U ≤ (πk - πko)
U ≤ (πk - πko) + (Sk - Sko)
Case I.2
U ≤ (πk - γπm)









































































































































U ≤ (πm - πko)
U ≤ (πm - πko) + (Sm - Sko)
Case II.2
U ≤ (πm - γπm)
U ≤ (πm - γπm) + (Sm - γSm)
We will first look at the producer’s incentive to update. The maximum level
of U for which an update is individually rational is defined by the conditions
in Table 1.
Comparing the condition for individually optimal updates, we find that the
incentive to update (measured by the maximum or cut-off level of updating
cost that the producer is willing to incur) is smallest in the case where the
updated database would attract copiers, but an out-of-date database would
not (Case I.2)
The incentive to update is largest in the case where by updating the term of
protection  can  be  extended  and  both  the  updated  and  the  out-of-date
database  would  attract  copiers  (Case  II.1).  In  this  case,  by  updating,  the
producer does not only prevent the devaluation of the database, but he also
ensures  a  position  in  which  he  can  earn  monopoly  rather  than  Bertrand
profits.
The second largest incentive to update is given where updating does not
lead to a change in effective protection compared to not updating, i.e. in the
                                               
24 One  has  to  be  careful  with  respect  to  the  ‘optimality’  of  producer’s  decisions.  Since  a
database, once produced, will not be used to a socially optimal extent as long as k > 0, no
first-best solution can be achieved. Optimality, therefore, refers to the best possible result (in
terms of welfare) in each setting.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 11
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situation  where  an  additional  period  of  protection  will  be  achieved  by
updating, but this extension will be relevant only for up-to-date databases
because an out-of-date database would not attract copiers (Case II.2). In this
case, updating does not have the effect of converting Bertrand profits into
monopoly profits.
This relative position of the respective cut-off levels can be derived from the
following inequalities:
(πk - γπm) < (πk - πko) < (πm - γπm) < (πm - πko)
The  first  and  the  last  inequality  require  γπm  >  πko,  which  must  be  true
because γπm is the maximum profit that can be earned from the sale of an
out-of-date  database  which  must  be  greater  than  πko.  The  remaining
inequality holds if the absolute size of the loss from being forced to set the
Bertrand price is greater for an up-to-date database (πm - πk) than for an out-
of-date database (γπm - πko). A sufficient condition for this is that the marginal
revenue from selling an additional unit of database services from an up-to-
date  database  is  greater  than  the  marginal  revenue  for  an  out-of-date
database. Given our assumption that the valuation of an out-of-date database
is a fraction of the valuation of an up-to-date database (expressed by inverse
demand functions p(x) and γp(x) respectively), this condition holds.
To sum up, we find an increase in the incentive to update from Case I.2 to
Case I.1 to Case II.2 to Case II.1.
Comparing  the  incentives  for  updating  faced  by  the  producer  and  the
conditions  for  socially  optimal  updating,  we  find  that  the  individual
incentives are smaller than is socially optimal except for the situation where
updating leads to an extension of protection and both the out-of-date and the
up-to-date database would be subject to the threat of potential competition
from  copiers.  In  this  case,  the  producer  may  even  want  to  update  the
database although the database should not be updated from a social point of
view.  Thus,  the  possibility  to  extend  protection  by  updating  creates  an
incentive for excessive updating.
Whenever the difference in consumer surplus brought about by updating is
positive, the maximum level of U  for which updates are socially optimal
exceeds the level for which updates are individually optimal. For the case of
limited protection, the difference is Sk - Sko (Case I.1) and Sk - γSm (Case I.2),
respectively (see  Table 1). Clearly, if the price charged for database services
is the same, then consumer surplus is greater for an up-to-date database than
for an out-of-date database. Hence the first difference is positive (Case I.1).
Furthermore, the consumer surplus is greater at the Bertrand price than at
the monopoly price (Sk > Sm) so that for γ ≤ 1 the second difference must be
positive, too (Case I.2). Therefore, in the case of limited protection there are
levels  of  update  costs  at  which  a  profit  maximising  supplier  will  decide
against updating even though updates would be socially preferable.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 12
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The same is true for the case of extended protection conditional on updating
where  an  out-of-date  database  would  not  attract  copiers  (Case  II.2).  The
relevant  difference  in  consumer  surplus  is  given  by  Sm  -  γSm,  which  by
definition is positive for γ < 1.
This leaves us with case II.1, i.e. the case where updating leads to extended
protection, and an out-of-date database would attract copiers. In this case,
the difference in consumer surplus is given by Sm - Sko, and this difference
will be negative if Sm < Sko. We can write consumer surplus in the case of
Bertrand pricing of an out-of-date database as








= + − + − ∫ γ γ γ ( ) .
Therefore, the difference is given by








− = − − − − − ∫ ( ) ( ) 1 γ γ γ .
This  difference  will  be  less  than  zero  if  the  last  two  terms  together  are
greater than (1 - γ)Sm, which is the more likely the closer γ is to 1, and the
lower is k. This is to say, that an incentive for excessive updating, expressed
by the fact that consumer surplus will decrease as a consequence of updating
leading to an extended term of protection, is the more likely to occur the less
the database loses in value from getting out of date, and the lower the price
at  which  database  services  would  have  to  be  sold  under  the  threat  of
competition from copiers.
To verify that society as a whole may be worse off from updating in the case
where updating creates a monopoly situation (whereas without updating we
would have Bertrand competition), we have to look at the difference in total
welfare which is given by




x x m k
o
+ − + − = − − − ∫ ∫ π π γ γ 1
0 0
Clearly, for γ getting close to one (i.e. for a small devaluation of an out-of-
date database),  although  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  producer  to  invest  in
updating, this leads to a decline in total welfare . For γ getting close to one,
updating does not create any value. Granting producers extended protection
if  they  update  the  database  in  this  case  leads  to  pure  rent-shifting  from
consumers to producers.The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 13
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4.  The EC-directive and the Incentives to Update
We now want to  apply the results from the previous section  to  the legal
provision incorporated in the proposed directive for the legal protection of
databases:
1)  Even  though  awarding  a  monopoly  position  to  the  producers  of
databases  by  granting  them  legal  protection  creates  an  additional
incentive for updating databases, they may fail to update the database
if it were socially optimal to do so. The reason is that the social value
of an update is not adequately reflected in monopoly profits.
2)  By awarding a monopoly position to the producers of databases, the
social  value  of  updates  is  diminished.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that
although  updating  avoids  a  decrease  in  the  social  value  of  the
database,  this  comes  at  the  cost  of  a  social  welfare  loss  due  to
underutilisation. Thus, from society’s point of view it may be better to
have out-of-date databases available at a low price rather than having
up-to-date  databases  available  at  a  high  price.  Updating,  although
increasing the social value of the database, may very well hurt society
if  it  can  be  obtained  only  by  awarding  monopoly  rights  to  the
producer, thereby reducing the number of users that will access the
database.
3)  If  the  lifetime  of  the  database  is  longer  than  the  effective  term  of
protection  (i.e.  longer  than  15  years  for  protection  against
unauthorised extraction), the producers may decide not to update the
database even if it were socially optimal to do so after the protection
has expired.
4)  Granting  a  renewed  term  of  protection  conditional  on  investment
which gives rise to ‘substantial changes’ of the database will increase
the incentive to update. This increased incentive, however, may come
from rent shifting from users to producers and may thus be harmful
to society as a whole. Thus, the provisions that allow for obtaining a
fresh  term  of  protection  may  create  an  incentive  for  excessive
updating the database.
5)  This excessive incentive is the more likely, the lower the decrease in
valuation that can be prevented by updating and the lower the price
at which database services would be sold under threat of competition
from copiers.
6)  Thus, the provision of granting a fresh term of protection conditional
on substantial changes suffers from serious problems25:
                                               
25  This  seems  to  be  of  practical  relevance  mainly  with  regard  to  the  right  to  prevent
unauthorized extractions. It is more plausible to assume the lifetime of a database  to  be
greater than 15 years than to assume the lifetime of the database to be greater than the term
of copyright protection (e.g. 70 years after the death of the author).The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 14
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•  If  updating  the  database  does  not  constitute  a  substantial
change and the lifetime of the database is greater than the term
of  protection,  then  the  legal  protection  provided  by  the
proposed  directive  is  insufficient  inasmuch  as  for  certain
periods the incentive to update the database decreases, despite
it being  socially optimal to update the database.
•  If updating the database constitutes a substantial change, this
provision may create an excessive incentive for updating.
7)  This indicates that the exact determination of what level of investment
in updating should be considered as a “substantial change” plays a
crucial  role.  While  it  might  seem  plausible  to  define  substantial
changes by specifying a “minimum effort” that has to be undertaken
in order to receive renewed protection, our analysis suggests that it is
important to set an upper limit to updating cost.
8)  If  updating  prevents  the  database  from  losing  value,  producers
should have a natural incentive to invest in updating, in particular if
updating costs are low. This incentive can be increased by granting
extended protection following an update, i.e. producers will update
the database in cases  where they would not  have done so without
extended protection. However,  because  the  social  value  of  updates
decreases, updates requiring extended protection may not be socially
desirable.  The  socially  problematic  cases  are  those  in  which  the
producer has an excessive incentive to invest in updating. The above
condition for updates which are not socially harmful can be rewritten
as
  U p x dx p x dx
x x m k
o
≤ − − ∫ ∫ ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
0 0
γ γ
  which  implicitly  defines  an  upper  limit  to  updating  cost.  Extended
protection should be denied if the producer has invested more than
this  threshold  value  in  updating,  because  this  indicates  that  this
decision  has  been  motivated  by  socially  harmful  rent-shifting
considerations.
5.  Concluding remarks
The previous sections have shown how the impact of the proposed directive
on  the  incentives  to  update  databases  may  be  analysed  with  standard
economic tools. The results of this analysis have been summarised in section
4.  Of  course,  this  analysis  could  be  extended  and  refined.  Aside  fromThe EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 15
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extending the model26, the analysis presented above could be supplemented
by considerations from the New Institutional Economics.
This would shift the focus of the analysis from ‘gross welfare’ comparisons
to the way in which suppliers and users of database services interact. Thus,
more attention would be paid to the different forms of contracts that govern
the relationships between database producers and users.
Supposedly, the contracts differ widely between databases that are accessible
via on-line research and those that are distributed independent of networks
via CD-ROM. In the past, databases have been produced and distributed
even  without  the  explicit  legal  protection  granted  by  the  proposed
directive.27  Obviously,  the  problem  of  an  adequate  remuneration  to  the
authors of databases or the providers of database services has been solved
without the help of the law. The arrangements between suppliers and users
that have been arrived at by contracting between these two parties, could be
used as a benchmark against which to compare the proposed directive.
Another  approach  could  focus  on  how  the  introduction  of  explicit  legal
protection changes the positions of the contracting parties, the distribution of
gains from contracting, and, thus, the incentives that users and suppliers of
database services will face. Of course, this kind of analysis requires a more
sophisticated modelling than the type of welfare analysis provided in this
paper. Nevertheless, even simple welfare analysis should make clear that a
piece of legislation such as the proposed directive for the legal protection of
databases will change the economic environment of the respective decision
makers in many ways. The analysis shows that provisions like the renewal of
the term of protection conditional on making substantial changes which, at
first glance, looks like a clever solution, may, on closer inspectionm, reveal
some shortcomings.
In any case, the question of how new forms of information goods should be
protected  by  law—if  they  should  be  protected  at  all28  -  and  how  legal
protection  creates  and  changes  incentives  to  producers  and  users,  can  be
seen as a promising ground for future research in law and economics.
                                               
26  The model could be extended, for example, by discounting future profits, costs and surplus
or allowing for a gradually decreasing valuation of out-of-date  databases  or  a gradually
increasing cost of updating with the number of periods the database has not been updated.
27  All  over  the  world,  approximately  3000  databases  are  provided  for  on-line  research.The
number of databases available on CD-ROM is assumed to increase sharply in the future (cf.
Mehrings, 1989 or  Hoebbel, 1993).
28  For a general treatment of legal protection for new forms of information goods see Reichman
(1994).The EU-Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the Incentives to Update page 16
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